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Abstract: Venture capitalists provide money and non-monetary contributions to high-growth ventures to help them become great companies. 
Although it is known that these contributions have an impact on the growth of the firm, little is known in Mexico of their nature, how they get into 
the venture, and how they contribute to the development of the company. The present article reports a proposed substantive theory that explains 
how the venture capitalist work hand in hand with the entrepreneur to grow the company. This substantive theory emerged from data collected 
through interviews to nine venture capitalists and nine entrepreneurs, and analyzed as proposed by the grounded theory methodology. The re-
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Introduction
The venture capital industry was born in the United States of Ameri-
ca, U.S.A., in 1946 when the firm American Research and Develop-
ment was created to invest in technology-based young firms, howe-
ver it was not until the 70s-80s, mainly due to regulatory changes, 
when the industry attracted more money and venture capitalists 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2006). Today, venture capital is recognized as 
the main source of innovation and new jobs, and the growth engine 
of an economy (Lerner, 2009). Venture capital is new in Mexico and 
is in its early-stage of development. From 2010 to 2016, deals closed 
in Mexico were 522 vs. 59,005 in the U.S.A., and exits in Mexico were 
21 vs. 5,981 in the U.S.A. (NVCA, 2017; “Overview of the venture 
capital industry in Mexico - October 2016,” 2017). Due to the attracti-
veness of this industry worldwide, the Mexican government initiated 
efforts to detonate the growth of venture capital at the beginning of 
this millennium. For example, the government created the venture 
capital fund Fondo Emprendedores CONACYT-NAFIN to invest in 
ventures based on scientific and technologic breakthroughs in 2004, 
the venture capital fund of funds Mexico Ventures I to increase the 
number of independent venture capitalists in the country in 2010, 
and the seed capital fund Fondo de Coinversión de Capital Semilla to 
increase the number of viable business opportunities for the venture 
capital industry in 2013 (Ramírez, 2015). Today, despite these efforts 
to invigorate the industry that resulted in the creation of 14 venture 
capital funds (“Estadísticas,” 2017), venture capital is referred to as 
“capital emprendedor” in Mexico, venture capital financing is still ba-
rely known in Mexico.
Venture capital is a special kind of financing. The venture capitalist 
uses money from investors to capitalize very risky business oppor-
tunities, most of them with innovative products and services which 
usefulness has not yet being accepted by the market (Hellmann & 
Puri, 2000). The venture capitalist knows how to minimize risks and 
has special knowledge and capabilities to grow ventures (De Clercq 
& Manigart, 2007). On the other hand, the high-growth entrepreneur 
creates ventures that, unlike traditional entrepreneurial endeavors, 
transform innovative ideas into high-value-added products for very 
large markets (Hellmann & Puri, 2000). Thus, when looking for fi-
nancing, the high-growth entrepreneur chooses a venture capitalist 
with the money needed to market his product, and with knowled-
ge and abilities to help him grow his venture (Knockaert, Lockett, 
Clarysse, & Wright, 2006). The venture capitalist and the high-growth 
entrepreneur become partners and work together to grow the venture 
exponentially, in a working relationship that will last for several years.
 
The venture capitalist - entrepreneur relationship begins when the 
entrepreneur pitches his business opportunity to the venture capita-
list, and often prevails until the venture capitalist withdraws his inves-
tment from the company. The venture capitalist is not just a provider 
of financial resources to the venture, he becomes an owner of a stake 
in the venture. The initial and dominant approach to study the ven-
ture capitalist - entrepreneur relationship reported in the literature 
was the agency problem (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003). The belief was 
that the entrepreneur behave opportunistically due to misaligned ob-
jectives and contrasting risk preferences with respect to the venture 
capitalist. Contrary to opportunistic behavior and self-interest, later 
the characterization of the relationship was one of trust and collabo-
ration (Leece, Berry, Miao, & Sweeting, 2012). From this perspective, 
the entrepreneur seeks to improve the performance of the venture 
because: (a) his interests are aligned with those of the venture capi-
talist and the organization; (b) he perceives justice in dealing with 
the venture capitalist and consequently does his best effort; and (c) 
he has economic motives to cooperate and promote a collaborative 
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relationship with the venture capitalist. The new approach suggests 
that a good venture capitalist – entrepreneur relationship is necessary 
for the development of the venture.  
Despite the fact that activities carried out by the venture capitalist 
in the U.S.A. are reported in an abundant literature, little is known 
about the value contributions of venture capitalists. How do they add 
value to their companies? In particular, what are the venture capita-
lists’ resources transferred to the company? what are the mechanisms 
used by venture capitalists to add value? and what are the factors that 
impact on those mechanisms that finally determine the value added 
to the company? Knowing about how value added is created between 
the venture capitalist and the high-growth entrepreneur could con-
tribute to open the black-box of the venture capitalist’s involvement, 
and reduce the number of venture capital-backed firms that fail. Gage 
(2012) places the number of venture capital-backed firms that fail at 
75%. Therefore, the objective of this article is to explain the value con-
tributions of the venture capitalist to the venture in Mexico. Following 
this introduction, the article describes the activities carried out by the 
venture capitalist reported in the literature, describes the qualitative 
approach used to analyzed data, introduces the study’s participants, 
presents the substantive theory that emerged from the information 
provided by the participants, and suggests implications of the study.
Literature Review
The literature on venture capital seeks to understand two main phe-
nomena related to the venture capitalist journey of making a return 
on his investment: how venture capitalists choose investment oppor-
tunities, and how they contribute to grow the venture. In this regard, 
the venture capitalist not only knows how to choose successful bu-
siness opportunities but he also knows how to build them (Baum & 
Silverman, 2004). The following literature review seeks to understand 
the contributions made by the venture capitalists to grow the venture. 
Based on the framework proposed by Sapienza & Villanueva (2007), 
the review focused on the independent venture capitalist, took into 
account the perspectives from both the venture capitalist and the en-
trepreneur, and contemplated the activities carried out by the venture 
capitalist once the cash arrived into the company. Overall, contribu-
tions of the venture capitalist are intended to balance the inexperience 
of the entrepreneur to manage growth, to satisfy the entrepreneur’s 
advisory needs, and to introduce corporate governance into the ven-
ture (De Clercq & Manigart, 2007; Large & Muegge, 2008). In the 
remaining of this section, a differentiation is made between direct and 
indirect contributions of the venture capitalist. In addition, there is 
still and ongoing debate on whether the venture capitalist adds value 
to the venture that is addressed at the end of this section.
Direct Contributions
The venture capitalist contributes directly to the venture by infor-
mally participating in meetings with the entrepreneur and through 
telephone calls and e-mails, to name only a few (Maunula, 2006). The 
frequency of these venture capitalist – entrepreneur’s interactions de-
pends on the characteristics of the venture capitalist, the entrepreneur 
and the venture. For example, the greater goal congruence between 
the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, the more entrepreneur’s 
new venture experience, the greater the geographic distance between 
the venture and the venture capitalist, the higher the venture stage 
of development, and the less degree of technical innovation the ven-
ture is pursuing, the smaller the frequency of interactions (Sapienza 
& Gupta, 1994). The formal participation of the venture capitalist in 
the venture is through the board of directors, often with a controlling 
position of the company (De Clercq & Manigart, 2007).  From the 
board, the venture capitalist acts like a sounding board, monitors the 
financial and operational performance of the company, and makes 
sure that the management fulfills its obligations (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2002).
Large & Muegge (2008) group the most common direct activities ca-
rried out by the venture capitalist into matters related to recruiting, 
mandating, strategizing, mentoring, consulting, and operating. The 
recruiting activities comprise “advising, doing reference checks, re-
cruiting, negotiation, assessment, and replacement;” mandating acti-
vities cover “providing contract and policy terms, control rights, stock 
rights, contingent rights, performance targets, reports, and controls;” 
strategizing activities encompass “developing business concept/stra-
tegies, doing strategic planning, and keeping focus on longer-term 
strategic direction;” mentoring activities consist of “providing men-
torship, advice, coaching, guidance, facilitation, feedback, motiva-
tion, patience, moral support, friendship; acting as confidant, soun-
ding board, and implanting entrepreneurial orientation;” consulting 
activities comprise “providing business intelligence, contacts, exper-
tise, competence, and teach business skills;” and operating activities 
include “providing decision making, compensation and incentives, 
appraisals, discipline, day-to-day hands-on management, professio-
nalization, and managing crises and problems.”
Unlike the above activities that mainly seek to add value to the com-
pany, monitoring and control activities carried out by the venture 
capitalist are oriented to protect the value of the investment, and to 
reduce agency and business risks (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003). Moni-
toring activities include observing the operational, financial, business 
strategy, and product-market performance of the venture (Maunula, 
2006). Monitoring cannot be carried out on a continuous basis and it 
is costly. This high cost of monitoring remote companies may partia-
lly explain the tendency of venture capitalists to invest in firms that 
are close to them (Bernstein, Giroud, & Townsend, 2016). Monitoring 
the performance of the company helps spot variations according to 
plan, and controls allow correcting such variations (Kaplan & Strom-
berg, 2002). Among the most powerful control mechanisms that 
venture capitalists have are staged financing and replacing the CEO. 
Staged financing gives the venture capitalist the option of abandoning 
his effort if he is not certain of the growth potential of the company 
(De Clercq, Fried, Lehtonen, & Sapienza, 2006), and replacing the 
CEO, which in most cases means taking away the role of leader from 
the entrepreneur, is a measure taken by the venture capitalist when 
the entrepreneur cannot transition to a manager’s role (Hellmann & 
Puri, 2002). 
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Indirect Contributions
In addition to the so-called direct contributions of the venture capita-
list, there are indirect contributions made by the venture capitalist to 
the company through his business networks and reputation (Davila, 
Foster, & Gupta, 2003). An important feature of a successful venture 
capitalist is his specialized business networks and his ability to levera-
ge these business relationships for the benefit of the venture (Bottazzi 
& Da Rin, 2002). Usually made up of entrepreneurs, lawyers, consul-
tants and experts familiar with recently created firms, his business 
networks help the venture accomplish goals such as identifying ma-
nagement team’s candidates, sourcing strategic information, creating 
alliances to drive the growth of the company, obtaining additional 
financing, and reducing information asymmetries in an initial public 
offering (Campbell & Frye, 2006). His business networks are a scarce 
resource and have a limited reach, thus the tendency of the ventu-
re capitalist to invest in companies in a given geographical location 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2006).
On the other hand, the reputation of the venture capitalist is related 
to his ability to generate value. A history of backing successful ventu-
res significantly enhances the reputation of the venture capitalist (De 
Clercq et al., 2006). The immediate availability of success and failure 
stories on the Internet and the compact nature of entrepreneurs’ and 
venture capitalists’ communities ensure that reputation is improved 
or damaged without delay (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011).   A good repu-
tation brings about benefits to the venture. Talented people are more 
likely to work in a company funded by a reputed venture capitalist 
because they perceive the venture has a higher probability to suc-
ceed (Davila et al., 2003). Moreover, a prestigious venture capitalist 
gets loans from banks with better terms (Hellmann, Lindsey, & Puri, 
2008), attracts high-quality capital investors and increases the proba-
bility to materialize returns for his investors (Kaplan & Lerner, 2010), 
and obtains higher venture’s valuation in an initial public (Bottazzi & 
Da Rin, 2002). Venture capitalist’s reputation also attracts investors. A 
venture capitalist that delivers results to their investors the first time, 
will likely continue to appeal to investors for his next endeavor (Me-
trick & Yasuda, 2011).
Debate Around Value-Added
Although the activities of the venture capitalist have been formally 
studied, there is still debate about the venture capitalist’s contribu-
tions to the venture. Research suggests that the venture capitalist con-
tributes significantly to the success of the company through his active 
participation in growing the venture, and that the value perceived by 
the entrepreneur and the performance of the venture are highly co-
rrelated (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004; Dimov & Shepherd, 2005; 
Edelman, 2002).   Moreover, entrepreneurs believe in the venture 
capitalists’ ability to add value to the venture (Bengtsson & Wang, 
2010). Also, the value added by the venture capitalist to the venture 
impacts positively the results of the company. Companies financed 
with venture capital perform better that those similar companies 
without this kind of financing (Campbell & Frye, 2006), and compa-
nies backed with venture capital are better valued in an initial public 
offering (Dolvin & Pyles, 2006). In addition, venture capitalists’ inves-
tments outperform the public equity market (McKenzie & Janeway, 
2011). Finally, contributions of the venture capitalist to the venture 
are related to innovative developments. An increase in venture capital 
in a given industry causes a significant increase in the rate of patent 
registrations in the industry (Kortum & Lerner, 2000).
On the other hand, other research questions the value added by the 
venture capitalist, whether the firm receives any contribution from 
the venture capitalist, whether it receives sufficient value, or whether 
it receives the needed value. How the venture capitalist adds value to 
the venture remains a focus of debate without consensus in the an-
swers (Bottazzi & Da Rin, 2002), and despite the direct involvement 
of the venture capitalist in the development of the venture, his con-
tributions are little understood (Wijbenga, Postma, Van Witteloos-
tuijn, & Zwart, 2003). In addition, venture capital backed companies 
perform no better than non-venture capital backed similar compa-
nies (C. K. Wang, Wang, & Lu, 2003). Moreover, when viewed as a 
process, the non-financial contributions of the venture capitalist are 
far from being understood since there is no consensus on inputs and 
outputs nor on their relevance, making it very difficult to improve 
the efficiency of the venture capitalist’s value contributions (Large & 
Muegge, 2008). Finally, the performance of venture capital is also re-
futed. For example, the aggregate performance of the venture capital 
funds is not different from that of the stock market (Kaplan & Schoar, 
2005). From above, it becomes evident that there is an opportunity to 
improve the understanding of venture capitalist’s non-monetary con-
tributions to the venture. Thus, explaining how the venture capitalist 
adds value to the venture will help with this endeavor.
Method
The approach of the study was qualitative and relied on the grounded 
theory methodology. First, data were collected through interviews 
with venture capitalists and entrepreneurs from seven venture capi-
tal funds in Mexico City and two in Monterrey. The interviews were 
carried out by the author in person and individually with an inter-
view guide with open questions that was pilot tested with industry’s 
experts. The guide was structured to capture information on whether 
the venture capitalist added value to the venture, on the nature of the 
value-added, on the relevance of the value-added, and on the impact 
of the value-added on the venture’s development. Interviews were 
conducted at the participants’ work place to find about their work 
environment and to achieve high quality audio. During the interviews 
1,414 minutes of audio were recorded, 48% of those minutes came 
from venture capitalists and 52% from entrepreneurs. The study was 
performed using the transcribed audio that resulted in 503 single-
spaced Arial-12 pages. The data were then analyzed with qualitative 
lens using the grounded theory methodology, as proposed originally 
by Glaser & Strauss (2006).  
The grounded theory methodology is commonly used to study abs-
tract and process-like problems in a given social context (Glaser, 
1992). Given that venture capital financing is a complex phenomenon 
involving frequent interactions between the venture capitalist and the 
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entrepreneur, and that the venture capital financing phenomenon 
is barely known in Mexico and rarely researched, more so from the 
qualitative perspective, grounded theory was the method of choice 
for analyzing data. From the beginning of the study, the development 
of a theory with explanatory power was sought. The “glaserian” ver-
sion of grounded theory used in this study defends the method of 
discovery where variables and categories arise from data and where 
each category intertwines with others to bring about the emergence 
of a substantive theory (Charmaz, 2006). The substantive theory is a 
theory of intermediate rank that arises from the analysis of data in 
texts on a particular subject, and can be used as an input to construct 
formal theories. The study proposes to generate a substantive theory 
from analyzing empirical data from participants, both inductively 
and deductively.
The grounded theory methodology offers not only a philosophical di-
rection for the development of a substantive theory but also proposes 
a method to assist the researcher in all aspects of data collection and 
analysis, and the writing of the theory (Glaser, 2002). The study used 
the constant comparison analysis method proposed originally by Gla-
ser & Strauss (2006).  This process of analysis is comprised of four 
stages: (a) the codification and the comparison of incidents; (b) the 
integration of categories and the definition of its properties, (c) the 
delimitation of the theory, and, finally, (d) the writing of the theory. 
At first glance, the method of constant comparison analysis may seem 
a simple linear process, in practice, however, is a complex process 
since collection of data and their analysis occur simultaneously. The 
researcher must return to each of the previous stages as the study pro-
gresses, and each stage of the process is an integral part of the develo-
pment of the grounded theory (Glaser, 1978).
In addition to the constant comparison analysis method, different 
analysis techniques were used at each stage to assist with the develo-
pment of the theory. Techniques such as focused and theoretical co-
ding, diagrams, and memos, as described by Charmaz (2006). Open 
coding was used to identify facts, characteristics, experiences, phrases 
and explanations that recurrently appeared in the participants’ data, 
and were recorded as codes. By using conceptual codes, focused co-
ding identified preliminary categories, helped name categories, and 
allowed to saturate or complete categories. Theoretical codification 
served to relate categories and integrate them into a theory.  Following 
Glaser (1978)’s recommendation for the researcher who starts with 
data analysis based on grounded theory, the theoretical code used was 
the Six-Cs, namely, causes, consequences, contingencies, conditions, 
covariance, and context. This family code fits the model condition-
cause-consequence of the present study. In addition, diagrams were 
used to integrate and to configure and relate categories, and to show 
the connections between them. Finally, memos, which are records 
of processes, thoughts, feelings, analytic perceptions, decisions, and 
ideas related to the study that arise from questions about concepts, 
were used throughout the study for the writing of the grounded 
theory. From data arise codes, from codes emerge categories, and 
from categories emanates the substantive theory. The memos are the 
basic element that serves to amalgamate these components in search 
of the grounded theory.
Special care was taken to ensure quality in this study by observing the 
criteria defined by  Charmaz (2006) related to the use of grounded 
theory methodology for capturing and analyzing data. The partici-
pants were the top managers of their organizations; general partners 
and chief executive officers. Sufficient data was gathered from both 
parties, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, to provide a full ran-
ge of contexts of the study of value-added. Moreover, given that the 
constant comparison method demands to continuously reviewing 
the coding of the information, once the data was coded manually, the 
coding process was repeated several times using the HyperResearch, 
specialized qualitative research software from Researchware Inc., to 
re-code data and manage codes. Finally, the results of the study were 
commented by participants: the resulting categories made sense to 
practitioners, and provided new insights to the value-adding process.
Results
The nine interviewed dyads, that is, nine venture capitalists and nine 
entrepreneurs in their portfolios, amounted for 100% of the venture 
capital funds, 38% of venture capitalists investing in companies in the 
country, and 27% of the ventures funded with venture capital in 2014. 
Profiles of the participants and their organizations are shown in Table 
1. On average, the venture capitalists are 41 years old individuals, with 
high level of education, and have two years of funding experience. 
The size of their funds is $20 million dollars and have two invested 
ventures in their portfolios. On the other hand, the entrepreneurs are 
42 years old individuals with mostly no previous experiences in laun-
ching ventures. Their ventures have four years in operation, three of 
those years with venture capital, employ 70 people, have annual sales 
of $3 million dollars, and were funded with $2 million dollars of ven-
ture capital. From a relationship perspective, two-thirds of venture 
capitalists are older than their related entrepreneurs, and more than 
three-quarters of venture capitalists have a higher level of education 
than their related entrepreneurs.
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Table 1. Profile of participants and their organizations
Object / Variable
Relationship #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Venture Capitalist
Years of age 44 40 44 36 37 33 58 51 41
Graduate studies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years funding ventures 8 2 5 0.5 0.5 4 2 1.5 1.5
Fund
Years in operation 8 2 5 0.5 0.5 1 3 2 1.5
# Venture capitalists 2 2 4 2 2 2 3 5 2
Employees 10 8 12 6 6 8 5 15 9
Fund size $20 $20 $100 $20 $5 $20 ND ND $70
# Funded ventures 6 2 10 1 3 1 1 1 8
Entrepreneur
Years of age 60 29 42 52 26 31 29 49 48
Graduate studies No Yes Yes No No No No No No
First venture Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Venture
Years in operation 4 3 4 6 0.5 4 8 9 9
Years with venture capital 3 0.5 3 3 0.5 4 6 5 1
Annual sales $3.2 $0.2 $3.1 $2.4 $0.2 $8.0 ND $28.0 $4.0
Employees 50 6 108 36 7 71 100 650 70
Capital invested ND $2.4 $7.0 $2.2 $0.2 $2.0 ND ND $2.0
Source: Elaborated by author.
Note: Fund size, annual sales, and capital invested are in million dollars.  ND means non-disclosed information.
Codes and categories
Data collected from participants resulted in codes, codes were inte-
grated into categories, and the categories defined a substantive theory. 
66 codes emerged from the data. Each of these codes contains words, 
phrases or concepts with similar meanings. Of these codes, 31 were 
common to venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, 11 were exclusi-
ve to entrepreneurs, 17 were exclusive to venture capitalists, and se-
ven additional selective coding codes from literature completed the 
categories. To help with the integration of the categories and their 
relationships, in this section codes are referred to with italics and ca-
tegories with SMALL CAPS ITALICS. The codes and their sources 
are summarized in Table 2. The same table also shows the resulting 
categories that are addressed in the following paragraphs.
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Table 2. Codes and categories generated from participants’ data
Code Source Category
ability to execute VC, E GROWTH
active participation VC, E RELATIONSHIP
advisor VC, E INVOLVEMENT
appreciation VC, E EXIT
being receptive VC RELATIONSHIP
best practices VC, E INVOLVEMENT
board member VC, E INVOLVEMENT
business environment E INVOLVEMENT
business relationships VC, E ENDORSEMENT
CEO replacement L INVOLVEMENT
certainty VC E ENDORSEMENT
commitment VC, E GROWTH
common goal VC, E EXIT
common sense VC INVOLVEMENT
consultant VC, E INVOLVEMENT







fast growth L GROWTH
financial return VC, E EXIT
financing VC INVOLVEMENT
focus VC, E GROWTH
goals’ alignment VC EXIT
incentives VC, E GROWTH
institutionalization VC, E INVOLVEMENT
investments VC ENDORSEMENT
justice L RELATIONSHIP
key employees E INVOLVEMENT
knowledge E INVOLVEMENT




orderliness VC, E INVOLVEMENT
outsourcing VC, E INVOLVEMENT
performance feedback VC, E INVOLVEMENT
performance goals VC, E GROWTH
performance measurement VC, E GROWTH
professionalization L INVOLVEMENT
promotion VC, E INVOLVEMENT
quality stamp VC ENDORSEMENT
reason VC INVOLVEMENT
relationship VC, E RELATIONSHIP
reporting VC, E GROWTH
reputation VC, E ENDORSEMENT
respect VC, E RELATIONSHIP
results VC GROWTH
sale VC EXIT
sense of urgency VC GROWTH
shared vision VC, E EXIT
smart capital VC, E INVOLVEMENT
sounding board E INVOLVEMENT
staged investments VC, E INVOLVEMENT




think big VC GROWTH
timely L EXIT
transparency E RELATIONSHIP
trust VC, E RELATIONSHIP
value VC, E EXIT
Source: Elaborated by author.
Note: “VC” means data from venture capitalist, “E” data from entrepreneur, and “L” data from 
literature.
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Five categories were integrated from these 66 codes: ENDORSE-
MENT with 10 codes, EXIT with 10 codes, GROWTH with 13 co-
des, INVOLVEMENT with 25 codes, and RELATIONSHIP with 
eight codes. Table 2 shows the results of coding integration. The inte-
grated categories are described in the following paragraphs.
ENDORSEMENT contains the codes: business relationships, cer-
tainty, credibility, endorsement, investments, quality stamp, reputation, 
success stories, support and talent. The category emphasizes that the 
company financed with venture capital benefits from the reputation 
and business relationships of the venture capitalist. The more inves-
tments the venture capitalist makes, the greater the reach and effec-
tiveness of his business relationships and the greater the likelihood 
that the investments will result in success stories. More success stories 
increase the reputation of the venture capitalist, which translates into 
stronger endorsement and support for the venture. A stronger endor-
sement assigns greater certainty to the business, attracts talent to the 
venture, increases the credibility of the business opportunity, and ove-
rall prints a quality stamp to the company.
EXIT contains the codes: appreciation, common goal, exit, financial 
return, goals’ alignment, leading company, sale, shared vision, timely, 
and value. The category accentuates the importance for the venture 
capitalist to timely complete their investment cycle with an exit. From 
the beginning of their relationship, the venture capitalist promotes a 
shared vision with the entrepreneur, seeks goals’ alignment and makes 
sure that the exit of the investment becomes the common goal. To ac-
complish the exit, the venture capitalist captures the attention of po-
tential buyers. He works with the entrepreneur to increase the value 
of the venture and to transform the venture into a leading company. At 
the end, the venture capitalist prepares the company for sale, commu-
nicates the company’s appreciation to potential buyers, and sells the 
firm to get a financial return for his investment.
GROWTH is formed by the codes: ability to execute, commitment, 
execution, fast growth, focus, incentives, milestones, performance goals, 
performance measurement, reporting, results, sense of urgency, and 
think big. The category emphasizes that the entrepreneur is the one 
who operates the company and the one who is responsible for the 
execution of the business plan and the growth of the venture. The ven-
ture capitalist assists the entrepreneur so that the venture achieves 
fast growth. In particular, the venture capitalist motivates the entre-
preneur to think big and to execute the development of the company 
with a sense of urgency. In addition, the venture capitalist designs in-
centives to focus entrepreneur’s efforts, appeals to the entrepreneur’s 
commitment to performance goals and milestones, and, in general, to 
getting results. On the other hand, based on his ability to execute, the 
entrepreneur gets results, carries out performance measurement of the 
venture’s development, and does the reporting of the achieved results.
INVOLVEMENT contains the codes: advisor, best practices, board 
member, business environment, CEO replacement, common sense, con-
sultant, controls, discipline, experience, financing, institutionalization, 
key employees, knowledge, mentor, money, orderliness, outsourcing, per-
formance feedback, professionalization, promotion, reason, smart money, 
sounding board, and staged investments. The category calls attention to 
the active participation of the venture capitalist in the development of 
the venture, both informally and from the board of directors as a board 
member. The venture capitalist relies on his experience and knowledge, 
in particular about the business environment and best practices, to work 
hand in hand with the entrepreneur to grow the company. In doing so 
the venture capitalist privileges the use of reason and common sense. 
Also, the venture capitalist plays the triple role of advisor, consultant, 
and mentor for the entrepreneur, hence the venture capitalist’s money 
is called smart money. Also, the venture capitalist drives the institutio-
nalization of the venture by creating a sounding board, by introducing 
orderliness and discipline into venture’s operation, by hiring key em-
ployees, by encouraging the professionalization of the activities, and by 
outsourcing non-core functions. Moreover, the venture capitalist gives 
performance feedback to the entrepreneur, and exerts particularly two 
kinds of controls to ensure the venture performs according to expecta-
tions, namely the CEO replacement and staged investments. Finally, the 
venture capitalist carries out the promotion of the venture, and helps the 
entrepreneur get additional financing.
Last, RELATIONSHIP is made of the codes:  active participation, 
being receptive, justice, relationship, respect, suitability, transparency, 
and trust. The category underlines the importance of building and 
maintaining a good relationship between the venture capitalist and 
the entrepreneur throughout the investment cycle. The relationship 
starts when the venture capitalist confirms the entrepreneur’s suita-
bility, mainly by assessing his ability to execute and his capacity of 
being receptive of venture capitalist’s advice to improve his own and 
venture’s performance. Trust, respect and results are conducive to a 
good relationship. Trust is the result of the transparency in the ven-
ture capitalist - entrepreneur’s interactions, and the justice perceived 
by the parties when making decisions. More transparency and bet-
ter perception of justice result in a better relationship. Also, results 
achieved by the entrepreneur affect the relationship. The relationship 
deteriorates if the company does not get the planned results. Finally, 
a good relationship is related to an active participation of the venture 
capitalist. The above five categories are related to each other, and defi-
ne the substantive theory described below. 
The Substantive Theory
The present study argues that the contributions of the venture capitalist 
are intended to build an exit for his investment. EXIT is the central ca-
tegory and the basic social process that resulted in a substantive theory. 
The category EXIT explains the main issues about the value contribu-
tions of the venture capitalist to the development of the venture, and 
points out the final goal of the venture capitalist’s value-adding process 
that is to provoke an exit. The following examples from participants and 
the literature highlight the importance of the EXIT:
“The venture capitalist has a clear and evident intention of high 
profitability because it represents also the commitment he made 
to his investors. The venture capitalist has to be very profitable 
for his investors, so the first thing he wants is that the exit is a 
convenient outcome for his investors.”  (Entrepreneur # 1)
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“The venture capitalist cares about his exit model, that was very 
clear to me from the beginning of the negotiations. He had a 
strong position on that. He wanted a safe way out for his investment.” 
(Entrepreneur # 9)
“VCs’ nature is that they need an exit point. This is how they 
make their money – only on the exits. Therefore, it is not good to 
them to have a management team that wants to build a perfect 
company over 20 years. … VCs want out as fast as they can. The 
minute they buy your share, their only concern is whom they are 
going to sell their shares to. Short-term profit is not a priority 
item. It does not matter at all. These are the dippiest, darkest se-
crets of the VC world.” (Ţurcan, 2008)
EXIT is also a basic social process as it is evident in the following 
observation from one of the participants:
“The entrepreneur must prove that with the money, he will be 
able to develop the venture and achieve goals: he needs to make 
the venture generate positive cash flows; he needs to turn the 
company into a relevant player in its niche; and he needs to make 
the company an attractive target for a strategic buyer, or for some 
other market player, to cause a way out for the investment.” (Ven-
ture Capitalist # 1)
This basic social process resulted in the substantive theory BUIL-
DING AN EXIT FOR THE INVESTMENT. SMALL CAPS 
are used here to refer to the substantive theory. This mid-range theory 
explains a phenomenon in a specific area, how the venture capitalist 
adds value to the venture, and could possibly contribute to the develop-
ment of a general theory of universal scope. The theory that arises from 
the very essence of the data is reported in a simple relational structure 
shown in Figure 1. The theory has explanation, scope, and relevance for 
the venture capitalist’s value contributions to the venture.  
Figure 1. Structure of the Substantive Theory BUILDING AN EXIT FOR 
THE INVESTMENT
The five categories emerging from the data of the participants are in-
tertwined to BUILDING AN EXIT FOR THE INVESTMENT. 
The ENDORSEMENT effect of the venture capitalist contributes to 
the GROWTH of the venture and enables an EXIT event. The re-
putation of the venture capitalist and his business relationships open 
doors to the venture and allow the entrepreneur to have access to 
resources otherwise unavailable such as the talent needed to poten-
tiate GROWTH. The stronger the ENDORSEMENT is, the higher 
the prospects to grow.  ENDORSEMENT also affects the EXIT of 
the investment. The venture capitalist’s experience in selling compa-
nies helps to effectively carry out activities conducive to the EXIT of 
the investment, such as identifying new investors, and defining and 
negotiating the terms of the EXIT, thus increasing the likelihood 
of an EXIT. On the other hand, an EXIT that results in a success 
story improves the ENDORSEMENT effect of the venture capita-
list. Venture capitalist’s INVOLVEMENT influences GROWTH 
and EXIT. Although the entrepreneur is responsible for executing 
the GROWTH of the company, the venture capitalist’s INVOLVE-
MENT conduces the entrepreneur towards accelerated GROWTH. 
The more INVOLVEMENT is, the higher the GROWTH of the 
venture. In addition, the venture capitalist’s knowledge and experien-
ces in EXIT events increase the probability of an EXIT. The more 
INVOLVEMENT of the venture capitalist increases EXIT options 
and improves the chances of obtaining a better yield. 
GROWTH of the venture depends on the ENDORSEMENT 
effect of the venture capitalist and on the venture capitalist’s IN-
VOLVEMENT in the venture.  GROWTH, in turn, is a condition 
of the EXIT of the investment. Over time, the focused and orderly 
GROWTH increases the value of the venture, attracts potential bu-
yers, and increases the probability of an EXIT. The RELATIONS-
HIP venture capitalist – entrepreneur is impacted by the GROWTH 
of the company. A venture’s high GROWTH leads to a better RELA-
TIONSHIP that in turn fosters the venture capitalist’s INVOLVE-
MENT. On the contrary, a bad RELATIONSHIP caused by bad re-
sults could translate into the dismissal of the entrepreneur as the CEO 
of the company. Finally, EXIT is the result of the venture capitalist’s 
ENDORSEMENT effect and his direct INVOLVEMENT in the 
company, and of the GROWTH of the venture. An EXIT event has 
an effect on the venture capitalist’s continuing operations. A known 
EXIT that represents a success story attracts new investors and allows 
the venture capitalist to create a new fund.  Also, success stories from 
a given venture capitalist attract more entrepreneurs looking forward 
to being invested by such venture capitalist.  
Value-added in Mexico
The venture capitalist in Mexico not only provides equity to the ven-
ture but also contributes with non-financial resources to the company, 
and, like Hsu (2004), concludes that in Mexico the source of capital is 
as important as the capital itself. From the participants’ perspectives, 
both venture capitalists’ and entrepreneurs’ perceive that the venture 
capitalist adds value to the company. To develop the venture, the ven-
ture capitalist in Mexico carries out activities similar to those accom-
plished by his American counterparts. These activities are described at 
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length in Large & Muegge (2008). However, the study highlights three 
activities particular to the venture capitalist in Mexico: the outsour-
cing of venture’s non-core functions to the venture capitalist’s fund, 
the focused search for an acquisition exit,  and the initial conversion 
of the venture to a specialized kind of business unit.
 
The venture capitalist structures his own fund’s internal functions, 
such as accounting, legal, information technology, and human re-
sources, to provides shared services to his portfolio’s ventures for a 
fee.  As a result, at least during the early venture’s development stages, 
the venture lacks these functions, and it is not clear when and how 
the venture recoups these functions to perform as a standalone com-
pany. The second difference is that the venture capitalist directs all 
his efforts to accomplish a trade sale of the venture and not an initial 
public offering, IPO like his American counterparts. This condition 
is apparently imposed over the Mexican venture capitalist due to cu-
rrent regulation and the small size of the stock market in Mexico that 
make very difficult to list a venture capital-backed company. Finally, 
in his effort to institutionalize the venture, one of the first tasks of 
the venture capitalist in Mexico is to ensure that the venture business 
unit is converted into a Sociedad Anónima Promotora de Inversión, 
S.A.P.I. The venture capitalist can invest his money only in busines-
ses with S.A.P.I. denomination. Considering that this is a new type 
of business unit in Mexico and that most of the time entrepreneurs 
are not aware of it and they create their ventures with traditional de-
nominations, the venture capitalist needs to help the entrepreneur to 
make the venture’s conversion in his effort to institutionalize the firm.
Conclusions
The substantive theory that emerged from participants’ data argues 
how the venture capitalist adds value to the venture for building an 
exit for his investment. To accomplish an exit, the venture capitalist 
makes use of his experience and knowledge to directly add value to 
the venture, and of his reputation and business relationships to add 
value through third parties. The venture capitalist works hand in 
hand with the entrepreneur to grow the company, make it profitable, 
sell it, and make a return on the investment. The study also revealed 
the importance of the relationship between the active investor and 
the responsible for executing the venture’s growth plan to achieve this 
goal. A good venture capitalist – entrepreneur relationship is essential 
for the sustained development of the venture and to accomplish the 
goal of exiting the investment. 
This exit goal, however, contrasts with existing views in the literature 
that relate venture capitalist’s value-added with achieving company’s 
milestones (De Clercq et al., 2006), with improving venture perfor-
mance (Busenitz et al., 2004), with growing the company (Croce, Mar-
tí, & Murtinu, 2012), with increasing the financial value of the venture 
(De Clercq et al., 2006), and with achieving a target company’s size in 
a given time span (Maunula, 2006). Although these goals are some-
how related, for example, achieving milestones improve the perfor-
mance of the company, better company’s performance translates into 
venture growth, growth improves the venture’s financial value and is 
required to achieve a desired venture size, and higher financial value 
for the venture improves the probability of achieving an exit for the 
investment, the exit of the investment is necessary to make a return 
on the venture capitalist’s investment. As a result, the ultimate goal of 
venture capitalist’s value-added is to exit his investment.
On the other hand, this particular finding of the venture capitalist’s 
exit goal suggests that attempts to measure venture capitalist’s value-
added should be related to the exit of the investment. The above sup-
ports Large & Muegge (2008) who argue “that future studies should 
examine ‘VC exit success’ as a high-impact dependent variable, and 
place greater emphasis on the measurement of directly observable 
events for both value-adding inputs and value-added outcomes”. 
The exit becomes a condition to measuring value-added, that is, 
there is value-added when an exit is accomplished. To measure the 
value-added by the venture capitalist, one should consider the type 
of exit and relate it to the expected venture capitalist’s contributions. 
Cumming, Fleming, & Suchard (2005) find that “there are five pri-
mary types of venture capital fund exits: initial public offerings (IPOs, 
or new listings on a stock exchange for sale to the general public), 
acquisitions (in which the venture capital fund and entrepreneur sell 
to a larger firm), secondary sales (in which the venture capital fund 
sells to another firm or another investor, but the entrepreneur does 
not sell), buybacks (in which the entrepreneur repurchases the inter-
est of the venture capital fund), and write-offs (liquidations).” Once 
the relationships type of exit – expected venture capitalist’s value-
added are known, one could measure and improve value-added.
Given the importance of building an exit for the investment, the high-
growth entrepreneur should choose a venture capitalist with good re-
putation and effective business networks to help the venture grow, and 
with proven success stories about how the venture capitalist multiplied 
several times his initial investment by achieving an exit. In addition, 
the entrepreneur not only has to come up with an innovative venture 
to qualify for venture capital financing, but he also needs to know how 
to grow a company, manage people, and get results. When the entre-
preneur lacks these abilities, the entrepreneur should choose a venture 
capitalist with proven success in accompanying venture’s investments. 
In any case, entrepreneurs need to be aware and be prepared to work 
together with the venture capitalist to develop the venture, to be recep-
tive to recommendations from the venture capitalist on how to improve 
personal and venture performance, and to act accordingly.  
Finally, given the larger size of the venture capital industry in Mexico, 
future research on the value added by the venture capitalist to the venture 
should move beyond anecdotal stage and dependence on individual tes-
timonies to a general study. This study identified already the significant 
variables and their relationships of the value-adding process, thus further 
research should be directed to answer the central question how to mea-
sure venture capitalist’s value-added. An extension to this study should 
be related to understanding the relationship between the properties 
and characteristics of the exits achieved by venture capitalists in Mexico 
and the value-added to the venture. A growing number of companies 
with disruptive business models, aggressive government support to the 
industry, and a growing number of venture capital funds in the country, 
are big motivations for continuing doing research on venture capital.
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